The State of the Talks

There is cause for some cautious optimism in the arms control developments of the last four days.

Soviet officials have taken the initiative with a sweeping nuclear arms cut proposal that at least suggests more movement than at any time since the arms talks were resumed in Geneva last March.

President Reagan has responded appropriately, welcoming the initiative but making clear that cuts will serve little constructive purpose unless they are selectively applied to reduce the threat that any power might have a first-strike capability to prevail over another.

Soviet delegates to the Geneva talks will conclude the presentation of their plan at a second extraordinary plenary session today. Only then can the United States give the proposals the appropriate scrutiny that has been promised. Already, however, Americans have noted that ambiguities and “blatantly one-sided” elements raise serious questions.

That is not surprising. Indeed, these are preliminary positions, presumably intended to set the stage for negotiations rather than to serve as the last word.

The Soviet proposal for a 50% reduction in nuclear arms may lead nowhere. As initially understood in Washington, the proposal was made contingent on a decision by President Reagan to abandon his Strategic Defense Initiative. Reagan has refused that from the beginning. That stubbornness now need not prevent agreement later that would spare both nations the enormous burden of girding for “Star Wars.”

Nor do we know whether the Soviet delegation, in its presentation at the negotiations in Geneva Monday, clarified the nuclear arms cut proposal. That, too, would lead nowhere unless the cuts were applied specifically to different delivery systems. The United States would, understandably, resist any agreement that did not take account of the enormous threat posed by the Soviet land-based nuclear arsenal.

Both Washington and Moscow have been maneuvering for advantage in anticipation of the November summit, a welcome recognition that world opinion matters, that nuclear arms control is everybody’s business. But there are signs of increasing seriousness as well, for both Mikhail S. Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan are struggling with domestic problems that will be easier to resolve if their nations can escape the terrible burden of the arms race in which they are now engaged.

The sense of positive movement and the improved atmosphere have increased the likelihood that the summit can be an occasion for writing guidelines for the negotiators at Geneva and that from those talks, in the months after the summit, there can be some real agreement.