Bad Timing

The post of Supreme Commander, Allied Forces in Europe, is an unusually demanding assignment. Whoever holds the job should have impressive military credentials, although that hasn’t always been the case. But he must also be a skilled diplomat, capable of bridging the differences that inevitably arise in an alliance of 15 democratic, independent-minded countries.

Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, who will retire on June 30 after eight years in the crucial post, has done an outstanding job--partly because his long tenure produced an important element of stability in relations between the United States and Europe. His successor, Gen. John Galvin, appears to be a good choice for the job.

Rogers’ greatest contribution has been his insistence that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s conventional, non-nuclear war-fighting capabilities be increased so that, in the event of a Soviet invasion, NATO forces would not be forced to go nuclear within days in order to avoid defeat. The strengthening of NATO’s conventional forces has a long way to go but, thanks in part to Rogers, the alliance at least is moving in that direction.

The allies have at times resented what was, at bottom, a call by Rogers for greater defense spending by the Europeans. But they have appreciated the equal energy with which he has resisted proposals for the reduction of the U.S. troop presence in Europe.

Galvin, the commander of U.S. military forces in Central America, should be a worthy successor. As a former commander of the U.S. Army’s 7th Corps in West Germany, he already knows the turf. And he has built a good reputation in Central America.

There is a real question, in fact, whether Galvin’s promotion to the NATO post at this time serves the best interests of the United States.

As commander-in-chief of the U.S. Southern Command, Galvin has nothing directly to do with the U.S.-supported contra war against the Nicaraguan government. But he is responsible for overseeing U.S. military operations in Central and South America, and is in effect the top U.S. ambassador to the armed forces in the region. At this point in history it is an important job that cries out for continuity, yet the Pentagon continues the practice of rotating commanders every two years.

This is especially unfortunate in Galvin’s case. He has tried to advance the evolution of Central American and South American armies toward greater military professionalism--and greater willingness to respect civilian authority. He has also tried to make the point that, in fighting Marxist guerrillas, it is counterproductive to subordinate human rights to “military necessity.”

It would have been wiser to leave Galvin at his post in Central America and either persuade Rogers to stay on as NATO commander or find another qualified man for the job.

Since that wasn’t done, the least that the Pentagon should do is adopt a more flexible rotation policy so that when this country has an unusually good general heading up the politically sensitive Southern Command, he can be left on the job.